In the area of dynamic revenue management, optimal pricing policies are typically computed on the basis of an underlying demand rate model. From the perspective of applications, this approach implicitly assumes that the model is an accurate representation of the real-world demand process and that the parameters characterizing this model can be accurately calibrated using data. In many situations, neither of these conditions are satisfied. Indeed, models are usually simplified for the purpose of tractability and may be difficult to calibrate because of a lack of data. Moreover, pricing policies that are computed under the assumption that the model is correct may perform badly when this is not the case. This paper presents an approach to single-product dynamic revenue management that accounts for errors in the underlying model at the optimization stage. Uncertainty in the demand rate model is represented using the notion of relative entropy, and a tractable reformulation of the "robust pricing problem" is obtained using results concerning the change of probability measure for point processes. The optimal pricing policy is obtained through a version of the so-called Isaacs' equation for stochastic differential games, and the structural properties of the optimal solution are obtained through an analysis of this equation. In particular, (i) closed-form solutions for the special case of an exponential nominal demand rate model, (ii) general conditions for the exchange of the "max" and the "min" in the differential game, and (iii) the equivalence between the robust pricing problem and that of single-product revenue management with an exponential utility function without model uncertainty, are established through the analysis of this equation.
Introduction
Many problems in revenue management have been formulated as optimal rate control of a counting process; see, for example, Feng and Gallego (2000) and van Ryzin (1994, 1997) . In this regard, the availability of an accurate fully characterized model in the analysis and optimization stage is typically assumed. For example, in the case of single-product revenue management (Gallego and van Ryzin 1994) , it is generally assumed that the demand rate is Markov in the current price, and in the case of multiple products (Gallego and van Ryzin 1997) , that the relationship between all prices and all arrival rates is known. When there are environmental factors (Feng and Gallego 2000) , the factor process is typically modelled as a finitestate Markov chain with known stationary transition rates. Analysis and computation of optimal pricing policies are typically made on the basis of these assumptions and as a result, successful real-world performance of the resulting policies depends fundamentally on the ability to obtain good models and to accurately calibrate the parameters that describe them.
Several papers have recently appeared where exact knowledge of model parameters is not assumed a priori, but learned using Bayesian updating (Aviv and Pazgal 2005, Lin 2006 ). While the Bayesian approach does not assume exact knowledge of all the parameters, it is based nevertheless on stringent assumptions that need to be satisfied if the resulting policies are to perform well in real-world applications. For example, well-known performance guarantees such as asymptotic convergence to the true value of the unknown parameter, depend on a correct specification of the model for the demand rate given the value of the unknown parameter. Alternatively, the convergence rate of the learning model depends strongly on the "accuracy" of the prior, and this is particularly important for short-horizon problems. In short, as in the case of classical dynamic pricing models (Feng and Gallego 2000; van Ryzin 1994, 1997) , the real-world performance of the Bayesian methodology depends fundamentally on the accuracy of the underlying models because optimal policies are computed under the assumption that these models are correct.
In many situations, however, the conditions underlying the Bayesian and non-Bayesian model-based approaches are not satisfied. First, modelling errors often arise through assumptions that are made for the purpose of analytical tractability. For example, contrary to commonly made "Markovian" and "stationarity" assumptions (e.g., Feng and Gallego 2000; van Ryzin 1994, 1997) , realworld demand rates are probably complicated functions of the history of prices and sales, and unlike the assumptions in Feng and Gallego (2000) , the transition rates of stochastic environmental factors are probably stochastic and nonstationary. Similarly, the real-world demand rates (given the unknown parameter) are probably more complex than the models in Aviv and Pazgal (2005) and Lin (2006) , which are chosen from a "conjugate class" because of tractability. In addition, the problem of calibrating a complex nonlinear arrival rate model, as in the case of multiproduct pricing (Gallego and van Ryzin 1997) , requires an enormous amount of data. These data are often not available, and models calibrated with limited data may contain large errors. This matter is complicated even further by the fact that historical data will be of limited value if the real-world demand processes that generates the data are nonstationary.
The general area of robust optimization has been largely driven by the observation that model errors need to be accounted for to obtain solutions that perform well in the real world. In this regard, much of this work in the OR/MS field has been done from the perspective of mathematical programming, where model uncertainty is represented by uncertainty sets on parameters of interest with min-max or probabilistic guarantee type objectives; see Ben-Tal and Nemirovski (1998 and El Ghaoui and Lebret (1997) for early examples of this line of research and Bertsimas and Sim (2004) , Bertsimas and Thiele (2003) , EI Ghaoui et al. (2003) , Goldfarb and Iyengar (2003) , and Atamturk (2006) for some recent contributions. While this approach is valid for certain problems, it is nevertheless an inherently static approach, and for this reason may be inappropriate in dynamic problems where factors such as the flow of information need to be accounted for. Research in the direction of dynamic optimization with model uncertainty has recently appeared in Nilim and El Ghaoui (2005) in the context of dynamic programming with uncertain probability transitions and is closely related to the earlier work of Epstein and Wang (1994) and Chen and Epstein (2002) . At this stage, we would only like to mention that our representation of model uncertainty is different from the ones in these three papers.
The goal of this paper is to present a systematic approach to finding "optimal" pricing policies for dynamic revenue management problems when there is model uncertainty, focusing primarily on the single-product problem. As in Gallego and van Ryzin (1994) , the underlying model for customer arrivals is a controlled counting process, although unlike Gallego and van Ryzin (1994) , we do not assume that the exact relationship between the price of the product and the customer demand rate is known. Rather, we consider a problem with a family of alternative models characterized (essentially) by a constraint using the notion of relative entropy with respect to a nominal model (obtained by calibrating a simple model to limited data, say). The size of this constraint set represents our confidence in the nominal model, and in the special case where it is a singleton set, we recover the problem studied in Gallego and van Ryzin (1994) . Similar approaches to the problem of dynamic optimization with uncertainty have been used in systems theory and electrical engineering (Charalambous et al. 2004 , Dai Pra et al. 1996 , Petersen et al. 2000 , Ugrinovskii and Petersen 1999 , 2001 ) as well as economics and finance (Hansen et al. 2005) , although in these contexts, randomness is modelled using Brownian motion. One contribution of this paper is the application of this general relative entropy approach to the problem of dynamic revenue management where uncertainty is modelled by a point process. Moreover, these ideas should be applicable to other important applications where the issue of model uncertainty is even more serious, such as multiproduct pricing, problems with stochastic environmental factors and uncertain transition rates, as well as general rate control problems (which arise in applications such as queueing). These extensions are the topic of current research (Lim et al. 2006 ).
An outline of the paper is as follows. In §2 we give a description of a nominal model for single-product revenue management. Following this, we show in §3 how uncertainty in the arrival rate model for a single-product pricing problem can be represented using the notion of relative entropy. This formulation (an adaptation of ideas from Dai Pra et al. 1996 , Petersen et al. 2000 , and Hansen et al. 2005 ) allows us to account for possible path dependence in the actual real-world arrival rate process and errors in the nominal model through a constraint on relative entropy. We show in §4 how the problem of optimal pricing when there is model uncertainty can be formulated as a stochastic differential game (see Dai Pra et al. 1996 , Petersen et al. 2000 , and solved through a version of the so-called Isaacs' equation, which is a generalization of the dynamic programming equation to two-player zero-sum stochastic differential games. The Isaacs' equation is a nonlinear ordinary differential equation (ODE), and the focus of §4.1 is to address certain fundamental technical questions associated with this equation. In particular, we show that the Isaacs' equation has a solution (which needs to be proven because the general theory of existence and uniqueness of solutions to nonlinear ODEs does not apply due to the form of the nonlinearities in this equation) and establish a socalled "verification theorem" that relates the solution of this equation to the value function and optimal pricing policy of the original robust pricing problem. In § §4.2 and 4.3, we establish some structural properties of the problem, including general conditions under which the "max" (for the pricing agent) and the "min" (for the opponent "nature") can be exchanged, and closed-form solutions for the special case when the nominal arrival rate is of the exponential type p = Ae −Bp . The availability of a closedform solution is interesting because there are few examples of robust control problems (in the framework of relative entropy) where closed-form solutions are available; see Dai Pra et al. (1996) and Petersen et al. (2000) . Finally, the equivalence between the robust pricing problem we have formulated and the optimal pricing problem with an unambiguous demand model but an exponential utility of total revenue as the cost is shown in §5. In particular, the value function of the robust problem can be interpreted as the certainty equivalent of the value function of the problem with an exponential utility, and the optimal pricing policies for both problems are shown to be the same. The equivalence is actually a special case of the duality between free energy and relative entropy from the theory of large deviations (Dupuis and Ellis 1997) that has been exploited in the area of risk-sensitive control (Dai Pra et al. 1996 , Petersen et al. 2000 . For the sake of completeness, we derive this correspondence via the associated optimality equations. We emphasize, however, that the main focus of this paper is robust pricing, particularly the formulation of this problem using relative entropy and the computation and analysis of solutions to this problem, which we show to be no harder than that encountered in the classical problem formulated in Gallego and van Ryzin (1994) . It is interesting to note, however, that the extension of this duality to more general robust pricing problems (such as multiproduct pricing) is significantly different from Charalambous et al. (2004 ), Dai Pra et al. (1996 , Petersen et al. (2000) , and Ugrinovskii and Petersen (1999) and the results in this paper because multiproduct pricing involves the sharing of a common pool of resources by different products with ambiguous demands, and the constraint associated with resource sharing leads to interesting phenomena. The reader can consult Lim et al. (2006) for more details. Section 6 contains concluding remarks.
Nominal Model
Let be a measurable space, N 0 T × → 0 1 2 a counting process, and t = N s 0 s t the filtration generated by N t , where it is assumed that = T . Suppose that a fixed number c of perishable items can be sold on the finite time interval 0 T . N t models the total number of sales that have been made up to (and including) the time t with single-item purchases occurring at the arrival times of the counting process. Revenue from a sale at time t is determined by the price p t − at the instant of the sale, and the total revenue on 0 T is given by the random variable T 0 p t − dN t . The arrival stream of customers for a limited number of perishable items is generally determined by a combination of factors, including the pricing policy of the firm, the time to expiration, the history of realized sales, the pricing policies of competitors, and the price of related products. The simplest dynamic model for customer arrivals assumes an instantaneous arrival rate t = p t that is Markovian in the price (see Gallego and van Ryzin 1994) . While extensions of this model to include other factors as well as the notion of online learning have been proposed (see, for example, Aviv and Pazgal 2005 and Lin 2006) , calibration difficulties and modelling limitations suggest that the stochastic model, no matter how complex, will at best be an approximation to the real-world situation. For these reasons, errors in the arrival rate model are unavoidable, and pricing policies that are robust with respect to these errors are of value.
Consider, as in Gallego and van Ryzin (1994) 
Because p is the price of the product being sold, it makes sense to restrict p to the set of nonnegative prices p p 0 and p ∈ for which the corresponding arrival rates p are nonnegative; that is, by Assumption (A), this restriction leads to the function 0 p → 0 b with b = 0 and 0 = p . The pricep is commonly referred to as the null price. By setting p to the null price, the demand and revenue rates become equal to zero, which allows us to meet the constraint that the number of items sold on 0 T does not exceed our initial inventory c. Furthermore, these assumptions imply that choosing a price p ∈ 0 p is equivalent to choosing an arrival rate ∈ + = 0 b . Finally, the last assumption concerning properties of r guarantees (amongst other things) that the "nominal problem" (1) has a finite optimal profit.
The function p = e −p satisfies all these assumptions. In this case, we have = − , = 0 , and the inverse function of p is h = − ln . The null price of p isp = and b = 0 = 1 so + = 0 1 . When p is restricted to 0 , we have 0 p 1. Observe that h is well defined for ∈ , although h 0 (and hence corresponds to a price) only when ∈ + . For the model studied in Gallego and van Ryzin (1994) , the arrival rate function p is assumed to be known. In this context, the selection of a pricing policy p t = p t X t − (where X t denotes the number of items remaining in the inventory at time t) specifies an arrival rate t = p t for the customer arrival process N t , and this in turn induces a (p t -dependent) probability measure under which N t is a counting process with rate t . This leads to the optimal pricing problem
denotes the class of admissible pricing policies. To ease the notation, we shall use the symbol p t to denote both a c + 1 dimensional deterministic function of time p t = p t 0 p t 1 p t c as in (2) as well as a scalarvalued predictable process p t = p t X t − , which is the interpretation in (1). While there is a small chance of confusion in certain situations, we believe that the meaning should be clear from the context. Observe that our restriction of pricing policies to those that are Markov in the inventory level X t − = c − N t − entails no loss of optimality because Markovian policies are optimal amongst all predictable policies because the arrival rate model p is Markov in the price; see also Bremaud (1981, Corollary 2, p. 206) .
If J t n denotes the value function for (1) and J t t n its time derivative, then the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) dynamic programming equation is
Compactness of the set 0 b and continuity and nonnegativity of the revenue rate function r on 0 b (Assumption (A), Part 3) implies that r achieves its maximal value when restricted to the domain ∈ 0 b . It follows, as in the proof of Proposition 1 in Gallego and van Ryzin (1994) , that (3) has a unique solution that is the value function of the nominal problem (1) with the associated maximizer p t n in (3) characterizing the optimal pricing policy (Bremaud 1981 , Corollary 2, Chapter VII). Finally, structural properties of the optimal pricing policy p t n can be obtained under additional technical conditions (Gallego and van Ryzin 1994) .
The primary objective of this paper is to formulate and solve the robust version of (3). The relationship between the solution to the robust problem (12) below, and that of (3), will be shown through the associated dynamic programming Equations (3) and (16) (below).
Model Ambiguity
In this section, we introduce the notion of relative entropy and show how it can be used to model ambiguity. Following this, we formulate the robust pricing problem as a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game through the Girsanov Theorem for point processes. This section is intended to serve as an introduction to this general approach to formulating stochastic optimization problems when there is model uncertainty, and the reader is directed to Dai Pra et al. (1996) and Petersen et al. (2000) for more details, Charalambous et al. (2004) and Ugrinovskii and Petersen (1999) for further work in this direction, and Hansen et al. (2005) for finance applications. We would like to mention, however, that the primary focus of the literature has been discrete-time problems or continuoustime problems where uncertainty is modelled by Brownian motion. One exception is an example in Dai Pra et al. (1996) , although the cost function they consider is different from the one in this paper.
Real-World Model
Assume for the moment that a pricing policy p t p t X t − (i.e., a nonnegative t -predictable process) has been chosen. Specification of p · induces a (nominal) intensity t = p t for the arrival process N t , which in turn specifies an underlying (nominal) probability measure for events in T .
In reality, the measure that governs the real-world arrival of customers for a given pricing policy p t is not but some other measure . Equivalently, the real-world arrival rate, while dependent on p · , is unlikely to be t , but rather some other t -predictable process t . This motivates the problem of finding effective pricing policies that are robust with respect to errors in the arrival rate model.
Following Chen and Epstein (2002) (see also Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989 and Hansen et al. 2005) , we use the terms ambiguity or model uncertainty (which will be used interchangeably in this paper) to describe the general situation where there is uncertainty concerning the accuracy of the underlying stochastic model. This contrasts to a risky situation (such as the toss of a fair coin) where the probability distribution on the set of possible outcomes is known (i.e., unambiguous). Ambiguity (uncertainty) can arise due to a lack of historical data (which is required to calibrate the model) or through modelling assumptions that are made for the purposes of analytical tractability. For the pricing problem, we are primarily concerned with ambiguity in the arrival rate, or equivalently, the probability measure associated with a given pricing policy p t .
Throughout this paper, we shall assume that the ambiguous real-world arrival rate t , while not precisely known, is absolutely continuous with respect to the nominal arrival rate model t = p t . More specifically, we assume that the real-world arrival rate t must be chosen so that events of measure zero under the nominal probability measure (induced by t ) are also events of measure zero under the real-world measure (induced by t ). That is, for any given pricing policy p t , the real-world arrival rate t is zero whenever the arrival rate predicted by the model, t , is zero; if t > 0, however, then t 0. In essence, by imposing absolute continuity, we are assuming that our nominal model t can accurately predict when real-world sales are impossible ( t = 0 implies t = 0). When sales are possible under the nominal model, however (i.e., t > 0), then they may or may not be possible in the real world ( t 0), and both the nominal and realworld measures may disagree on the likelihood of a sale occurring.
More generally, a probability measure is absolutely continuous with respect to (denoted ) if
From the discussion above, we shall assume that for any given pricing policy p t , the (ambiguous) real-world measure (with arrival rate t ), although not precisely known, is absolutely continuous with respect to the nominal measure (with arrival rate t ) that is induced by this pricing policy under the nominal model p . This restriction on possible real-world arrival rates (given our nominal one) is implicit in the model of ambiguity that is presented below.
Given a nominal measure on , -absolutely continuous measures can be represented by the Radon-
n is a finite discrete set and = 2 , then is absolutely continuous with respect to if q i = i − 0 whenever p i = i = 0 for every i. In this case, the likelihood ratio (Radon-Nikodym derivative) is the random variable , where
More generally, any -a.s. nonnegative T -measurable random variable T satisfying Ɛ T = 1 induces a -absolutely continuous measure on T defined by
where the random variable d /d is the Radon-Nikodym derivative of with respect to (Bremaud 1981 , Jacod 1979 .
The Girsanov Theorem (Bremaud 1981) describes the relationship between such equivalent changes of probability measure from to and the associated change in the arrival rate of N t . In this regard, let
Because t is a nonnegative martingale, it follows from Jacod (1979) 
Then, N t is an t -adapted point process with intensity t = t p t under .
In summary, any admissible pricing policy p t induces a nominal probability measure through the arrival rate process t = p t , where p is the nominal arrival rate model. The set of -absolutely continuous measures is parameterized by the set of nonnegative t -predictable processes t for which t is a nonnegative martingale, and changing measure from to is equivalent to changing the intensity of N t from t to t = t t . Ambiguity in the real-world arrival rate t and probability measure is equivalent to ambiguity in the process t . When t = 1, we have t = 1 and t = t .
Relative Entropy
Relative entropy is a measure of distance between two probability measures, which, in the case of the pricing problem, may also be regarded as a distance measure, between the nominal model's customer arrival rate p t and that of the real world, t . In the case of a finite probability space (see the discussion preceding Equation (4)), relative entropy is given by
, where we take 0 ln 0/p i = lim q i →0 q i ln q i /p i = 0. In the case of the pricing problem, the likelihood ratio d /d (between models t = p t t and p t ) is given by (5), and the relative entropy of with respect to is given by
where once again ln =0 = lim →0 ln = 0. It is well known that is convex in , and an application of Jensen's inequality shows that is nonnegative. Also, = 0 if and only if t = 1 (or equivalently, ≡ ). In this section, we show how model uncertainty can be expressed through a constraint on relative entropy, which, together with the Girsanov Theorem (Theorem 3.1), leads to a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game that can be solved for the robust pricing policy (see also Dai Pra et al. 1996 , Hansen et al. 2005 , and Petersen et al. 2000 for a similar construction).
The expected revenue under an admissible pricing policy p t and the nominal arrival rate function p (which induces the measure ) is
where N t under is a counting process with rate t = p t . Ambiguity in the real-world arrival rate t (which is almost certainly different from the nominal one t ) induces ambiguity in the probability measure and, in turn, ambiguity in the value of the expected revenue (7).
We shall assume (as in Dai Pra et al. 1996 , Hansen et al. 2005 , and Petersen et al. 2000 that ambiguity is adversarial; that is, "nature" chooses a real-world arrival rate with the objective of hurting the pricing agent's expected profit. By the Girsanov Theorem (Theorem 3.1), the choice of a real-world arrival rate by nature (or -absolutely continuous probability measure ) is equivalent to choosing a nonnegative t -predictable process t . This leads to a stochastic differential game between the pricing agent p t and "nature" t . In this regard, we need to define the set of admissible strategies from which t can be chosen.
The intuition behind our definition of ( (8) below) is as follows. The pricing agent begins by choosing a pricing policy p t = p t X t − that is revealed to nature. In response, nature chooses a real-world arrival rate t = p t t by specifying a nonnegative predictable process t . In general, t will depend on the entire history of sales X s − 0 s t and also the history of prices p s − 0 s t . For simplicity, however, we shall restrict nature's response to processes t = t X t − p t that are Markov in the current inventory level X t − c −N t − , and the current price p t . It turns out, however, that when the nominal arrival rate model p is Markov in the price (as is commonly assumed), then the optimal pricing policy and the optimal response by nature will also be Markov, so there is no loss of generality in our restriction.
With these notions in mind, define nature's class of admissible strategies by 
With
denoting the measure associated with a customer arrival rate of t = t p t , the expected cost under for a pricing policy p t is
Because nature is adversarial, this leads to the following robust counterpart of the expected revenue associated with a given (fixed) admissible pricing policy p t ∈ :
In other words, for a given p t , nature chooses a worstcase -absolutely continuous measure from the class of measures defined by the convex relative entropy constraint (9) by specifying the strategy t p ∈ . The constant 0 measures our confidence in the nominal measure and restricts the amount that (respectively, t ) can deviate from (respectively, t ). A large value of allows to deviate further from our nominal model, while a small value of is chosen when we have a high degree of confidence in our nominal model. The extreme choice of ≡ 0 leaves nature no choice but to choose the measure ≡ and (9) boils down to the standard (nominal) problem (1). As a general guideline, should be chosen in such as way that the set of models satisfying the ambiguity constraint includes those models that are statistically indistinguishable from the nominal. Alternatively, may be regarded as a "tuning parameter," and the pricing agent can add robustness to his/her pricing policy by solving problem (9) for some > 0.
Alternatively, we may consider objective functions of the form min Ɛ where, as before, denotes the measure induced by the counting process with intensity p t t . The constant > 0 may be regarded as a Lagrange multiplier for the relative entropy constraint in (9), and the worst-case measure associated with this constrained problem can be obtained by solving (10) with an appropriate choice of . (See Proposition 4.1 below for a characterization of the relationship between and .) Alternatively, represents our confidence in the nominal measure: A large value of puts a large penalty on deviations by nature from the nominal measure (as measured by ) and corresponds to a high degree of confidence in (or equivalently, the arrival rate function p ), while a small value of corresponds to less confidence in the nominal model. A choice of ≡ leaves nature no choice but to choose the nominal measure ≡ .
Pricing with Model Uncertainty
Consider the following two formulations of the robust pricing problem. The first of these follows directly from (9):
and the second is related to (10):
The following result characterizes the relationship between the solutions of (11) and (12). We consider only the case when > 0; clearly, the solution of (11) with = 0 is obtained by solving the nominal problem (1). For the sake of readability, the proof of this result has been included in the appendix; Ugrinovskii and Petersen (1999) can be consulted for a closely related result. The optimal value * of (13) is achieved, and the optimal solution p * * = p * * * * of (12) associated with = * is also the solution of the constrained problem (11).
Let J t n denote the value function for (12), where n is the number of items remaining in inventory at time t:
with
To ease notation, we shall adopt the convention F p = F t p t=0 , with F t p being reserved for the general case when t may be nonzero. Problem (14) is an example of a continuous-time two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game. Analysis of a general class of these problems in a setting where randomness is modelled by Brownian motion can be found in Fleming and Souganidis (1989) . Using (heuristic) dynamic programming arguments, the value function should be the solution of the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs (or Isaacs') equation:
and the solution of this equation, if it exists, should give the value function (these properties of Isaacs' equation, including existence of solutions, are established rigorously in Theorem 4.1 below). The solution of the (unconstrained convex) inner minimization problem in (16) is characterized by the first-order conditions and yields, after some manipulation,
Substituting back into (16) gives the following system of ODEs:
It is interesting to observe that when → , we recover the equation
which is nothing but the HJB Equation (3) for the nominal version (1) of this problem. The optimal pricing policy is obtained by finding the maximizing p in (18); see Theorem 4.1. In the special case when this solution p is strictly positive and p is differentiable and nonnegative for every finite p 0 (and hence we need not worry about the constraints on p), the firstorder conditions give the following implicit equation for the optimal pricing policy p t n :
Explicit representations of the solution to this equation p t n cannot be obtained unless specific functional forms are imposed for the nominal arrival rate function p . Nevertheless, it is interesting that the left-hand side of (19) matches the optimal response of nature (17). In other words, under the optimal pricing policy p t n and the assumptions just stated, the optimal response by nature (see also Theorem 4.1 below) is given by
Observe that t n < 1; that is, for any given pricing policy, the arrival rate chosen by the adversarial model of nature is typically smaller than the nominal arrival rate. t n changes in response to the price p t n and for this reason is typically a function of both time as well as the number of items sold. As a function of p, p may be increasing, constant, or decreasing, depending on the functional form of p . Finally, t n ↑ 1 as ↑ . That is, the impact of nature on the nominal arrival rate diminishes as confidence in the nominal model increases (i.e., as ↑ ).
Verification Theorem
Verification Theorem I. In this section, we show that (16) has a solution J t n , that this solution is the value function of (14), and that the maximizing p (respectively, minimizing ) in (16) characterizes the optimal pricing policy (respectively, response by nature).
We begin with the issue of existence and uniqueness of solutions of (16) (or equivalently (18)). The ODE (18) may be regarded as a special case of the nonlinear equationJ t = F J t . Classical results on the existence and uniqueness of solutions for nonlinear ODEs require that the function F J satisfies the so-called linear growth and global Lipschitz continuity conditions to be applicable. In the case of (18), however, neither of these conditions appears to be satisfied, and for this reason, alternative methods need to be used to guarantee solvability. To prove solvability, we consider several (auxiliary) ODEs that are related to (18) through a nonlinear transformation (see (21)- (23) below), and establish solvability of (18) by proving solvability for these related equations. Beyond their role in establishing solvability of (18), however, it turns out that these auxiliary equations also have interesting "revenue management interpretations," which we will also provide.
Suppose that p t = p t 0 p t 1 p t c ∈ is given and fixed. Consider the following ODES:
We shall assume throughout that the same admissible policy p t ∈ is chosen for both (21) and (23). The following basic properties of (16) and (21)- (23) will be used in our analysis. The proof can be found in the appendix.
Lemma 4.1. Suppose that Assumption (A) is satisfied. Then, we have the following results. (1) Let p t ∈ be given and fixed. Then, there is a unique solution Q t = Q t 0 Q t c of (23). Moreover, Q t n is continuous and there is a strictly positive constant > 0 such that
Q t n 1 for every t ∈ 0 T and n = 0 1 2 c. (2) Let p t ∈ be the same as in Part 1. Then, V t n = − ln Q t n is the unique solution of (21) and
is the minimizer in (21). Moreover, V t n is bounded, continuous, and nonnegative for every t ∈ 0 T and n = 0 1 2 c.
(3) There is a unique solution W t = W t 0 W t c of (22) and a function p t n that achieves the minimum in (22). Moreover, W t n is continuous and there is a strictly positive constant > 0 such that W t n
1 for every t ∈ 0 T and n = 0 1 2 c.
Operations Research 55(2), pp. 198-214, © 2007 INFORMS (4) J t n = − ln W t n is the unique solution of (16). This solution is bounded, continuous, and nonnegative for every t ∈ 0 T and n
achieves the inner minimum in (16) for every p 0 and there exists p t n ∈ 0 that achieves the outer maximization for every t n .
Observe that the minimizer in (21), defined by (24), is an admissible strategy because V t n is bounded for every n. The following result gives a characterization of V t n as the value function of a stochastic control problem and the strategy # t n p as the optimal response by nature for any admissible pricing policy. Recall that X t − = c − N t − is the remaining inventory.
Proposition 4.2. Let p t n ∈ be an admissible pricing policy with p t p t X t − , and let V t n denote the solution of (21) This result shows that the strategy # t n p defined by (24) is the optimal response by nature when the pricing policy p t n is chosen, and that V t n , the solution of (21), is the value function associated with the pair p t n * t n p .
Proof. Let p t = p t 1 p t c ∈ and t n p ∈ given and fixed, let N t be a counting process with rate p t t X t − p t , and let X t denote the number of items remaining in inventory at time t when arrivals are modelled by N t . From Lemma 4.1, Part 2, there is a continuous bounded solution V t n of (21) associated with p t . It follows from the chain rule that
Integrating from t to T and taking expectations with respect to (the measure under which N t has the rate p t t X t − p t ), it follows that
where the inequality follows from the observation that V t n is a solution of (21). In the derivation above, we use the fact that On the other hand, the same calculation with the admissible strategy t n p = # t n p , where # is given by (24), results in equality. This gives equality (27).
Consider now Equation (16) for J t n . It is easy to show that * t n p , the maximizer (over ) in (16), is given by (25). In addition, it is easy to see that * t n p is an admissible strategy because J t n is bounded for every n. The following result shows the connection between (16) and the robust pricing problem (12).
Theorem 4.1 (Verification Theorem I). Let J t n denote the solution of (16) This result shows that the solution J t n of (16) is the value function for the dynamic pricing problem (11) where the optimal robust pricing policy p * t n and the optimal response by nature * t n p are the maximizer and minimizer, respectively, in (16).
Proof. It follows from Lemma 4.1, Part 4 that there is a solution J t n of (16) that is continuous and bounded. Let p t ∈ be admissible and let N t be a Poisson process with rate p t * t X t − p t . Let denote the measure induced by this process. Then,
With X t denoting once again the number of items remaining in inventory at time t, we obtain
Integrating from t to T and taking expectations on both sides (and noting the boundedness of p t * p t as well as the integrand), we obtain
where the inequality follows from (16). Therefore, Verification Theorem II. In this section, we consider the pricing problem obtained by exchanging the order of the max and the min in (14). In particular, let G t n denote the value function of the stochastic control problem
J t n Ɛ
where = q t = q t 0 q t 1 q t c q · n 0 T → is measurable and bounded on 0 T
denotes the set of admissible policies by nature,
denotes the set of admissible strategies by the pricing agent, and denotes the probability measure induced by a counting process with rate t = t p t t . In (29), nature reveals its policy ∈ , and the pricing agent responds with a -dependent pricing strategy p t ∈ . Nature then responds by choosing from all admissible ∈ the one that minimizes the cost F t p . This defines the value function G t n . If given the choice, the agent setting prices would generally prefer the setup (29) over (14); this makes intuitive sense and is also reflected in the following inequality (which is easy to verify):
In this section, we obtain a characterization of G t n as the solution of an Isaacs' equation. This equation will be used in §4.2 to show that the inequality in (32) is actually an equality under additional assumptions on the revenue rate function r . To begin, consider the following Isaacs' ODE, derived using heuristic dynamic programming arguments for the stochastic differential game (29):
We assume for the moment that (33) has a unique solution.
(Conditions under which this is true will be discussed in the next section.) For every > 0, define
The first important result is the following verification theorem, which relates the solution of (33) (34) and (35), and * is the probability measure associated with the counting process N t with rate p * t * t .
Proof. Suppose that (33) has a solution that is bounded, continuous, and nonnegative. Then, inequality (36) and equality (37) can be established along the lines of the proof of Theorem 4.1. In particular, (37) shows that the solution of (33) coincides with the value function of the stochastic differential game (29). Uniqueness of solutions for (33) also follows from this observation. Indeed, by (37), any two solutions of (33) will be the value function of (29) and hence must be equal.
Isaacs' Condition and Interchangeability
In general, the value function for the robust pricing problem (14) and the differential game (29) are related in the following way:
The following result shows that the inequality is actually an equality and the optimal policies for both problems are equal, under the assumption that the revenue rate r = h is strictly concave. The proof of the following result can be found in the appendix. 
and G t = J t is the unique solution of Isaacs' equation (33 Suppose that the demand rate function for the nominal model is an exponential
where A and B are positive constants. It is well known that the nominal model under this demand rate has an explicit representation (see Gallego and van Ryzin 1994) .
In this section, we show that the dynamic programming Equation (16) (or equivalently, (18)) with this arrival rate function can be solved explicitly, giving us a closed-form expression for this special case of the robust problem (12). The availability of a closed-form solution is interesting because there are few examples of robust control problems (or standard control problems, for that matter) where these can be found (see Petersen et al. 2000 for other examples). Under specification (42), it follows immediately from (17) that
On the other hand, we see from (19) that the optimal pricing policy, under (42), is given by
Substituting (44) into (18), we obtain
The solution of this equation is
Observe that the solution coincides with that of a nominal exponential model with an arrival rate that is scaled lower by the constant (43). That is, in the case of an exponential arrival rate function, the suggested response by the agent doing pricing with model ambiguity is to behave as though the arrival rate function is a scaled version of the nominal model. For the exponential problem, the scaling factor is a constant. This is a special feature of the exponential arrival rate model, but is not the case for more general arrival rate functions where the scaling factor t n will be a function of both time and the number of unsold items (through its dependence on the pricing policy p t n ) see (19)).
Exponential Utility and Relative Entropy
Let U x 1 − e −1/ x denote the exponential utility function and consider the following optimal pricing problem:
Equivalently, let W t n denote the value function for the problem
In this section, we establish the equivalence between the robust pricing problem (12) and problem (46). In fact, this equivalence is a special case of the duality between free energy and relative entropy, a well-known result in the theory of large deviations (Dupuis and Ellis 1997) that has also been used in the area of risk-sensitive control (Dai Pra et al. 1996 , Petersen et al. 2000 . For completeness and the benefit of the reader, we shall establish this equivalence through the associated optimality equations. For some recent work on revenue management with an exponential utility, see Feng and Xiao (2004) .
The HJB equation associated with (46) is
Consider the change of variable
Observe that
that is, H t n is the certainty equivalent corresponding to the exponential utility function under the optimal pricing policy for (46). Using (48), we can rewrite (47) in terms of H t n :
Comparing with (18) and noting the equivalence between (16) and (18), it follows that H t n is also a solution of (16). Finally, because (16) is the HJB equation associated with the robust pricing problem (12), we obtain the following relationship between the robust pricing problem (14) and the pricing problem (46) with exponential utility. 
J t n = − ln W t n = H t n (50)
In addition, the optimal pricing policies for the robust problem (12) and the pricing problem (46) are equal.
Proof. It can be shown that the solution W t n of (47) is also the value function of (46), and that the maximizer in both (47) and (49) characterizes the optimal pricing policy for (46). On the other hand, the equivalence between (18) and (16) implies that the value function J t n of (12) is also a solution of (49), and the optimal pricing policy of (12) is also the maximizer in (49). It follows that (12) and (46) have the same optimal pricing policies and that equality (50) holds.
In summary, we have shown that the value function J t n associated with the robust pricing problem (12) equals the optimal certainty equivalent J t n for the exponential utility W t n defined through (46), and that the optimal pricing policies for both the robust and utility maximization problems coincide. Finally, we would like to mention that the duality we have illustrated does not hold in the multiproduct setting (except under special assumptions) if robust pricing is the primary objective. This issue is discussed in the paper by Lim et al. (2006) .
Conclusion
Model uncertainty is an unavoidable issue in many realworld applications. Traditional approaches to stochastic optimization typically ignore this issue, and it is not surprising that optimal policies obtained in this way may not perform well in actual applications. In this paper, we have shown how ideas from robust control can be used to obtain pricing policies for the dynamic single-product revenue management problem when there is uncertainty in the arrival rate model. Model uncertainty is represented by a constraint on the relative entropy with respect to the nominal probability measure (model), and the robust problem is formulated as a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential game where nature's objective is to choose a probability measure within the constraint set that harms the revenue of the pricing agent the most. The solution of this problem is characterized through the solution of an Isaacs' ODE, and properties of the solution of this problem, including interchangeability of the max and the min as well as interesting connections with the optimal pricing problem with an exponential utility function, have been obtained. At a higher lever, this paper illustrates a general approach to stochastic rate control problems when there is uncertainty in the arrival rates. This may be useful in problems such as multiproduct pricing as well as applications in queueing (Lim et al. 2006) , which are topics of current research. Finally, we have not addressed the problem of robust pricing when there is learning. This is an important problem, particularly in the case of nonstationary market conditions, and an issue we plan to address in future work. Suppose now that for some n = 1 2 3 c, W t n − 1 . Once again, −g n t x m x and Z T = W T n = 1, and hence W t n Z t .
Proof of Part 4. J t n = − ln W t n is well defined (from Part 3 of this lemma), and it is easy to show that it is a solution of (16). The remaining properties of J t n follow directly from those of W t n .
Proof of Theorem 4.3
Define f h + ln + 1 − − = r + ln + 1 − −
where is some positive constant. Observe that f is strictly concave in for every (because r = h is strictly concave, by assumption) and strictly convex in for every fixed . The equality (38)- (39) 
